The average Latin American country produces about 1 fifth of the output per worker of the US. What are the sources of these enormous income gaps? I report development-accounting results for Latin America. On average Latin America's overall physical and human capital endowment relative to the USA is essentially identical to Latin America's efficiency relative to the USA . In my main sample average relative capital and average relative efficiency are both roughly double actual average relative incomes. Hence, both capital gaps and efficiency gaps are very large: the average Latin American country has less than half the capital (human and physical) per worker of the US, and uses it less than half as efficiently. In assessing this evidence, it is essential to bear in mind that efficiency gaps contribute to income disparity both directly --as they mean that Latin America gets less out of its capital --and indirectly --since much of the capital gap itself is likely due to diminished incentives to invest in equipment, structure, schooling, and health caused by low efficiency. The consequences of closing the efficiency gap would correspondingly be far reaching. Explaining the Latin American efficiency gap is therefore a high priority both for scholars and for policy makers.
Introduction
The average Latin American country produces about 1 …fth of the output per worker of the US. What are the sources of these enormous income gaps? This paper reports development-accounting results for Latin America. Development accounting compares di¤erences in income per worker between developing and developed countries to counterfactual di¤erences attributable to observable components of physical and human capital.
Such calculations can serve a useful preliminary diagnostic role before engaging in deeper and more detailed explorations of the fundamental determinants of di¤erences in income per worker. If di¤erences in physical and human capital -or capital gaps -are su¢ cient to explain most of the di¤erence in incomes, then researchers and policy makers need to focus on factors holding back investment (in machines and in humans). Instead, if di¤erences in capital are insu¢ cient to account for most of the variation in income, one must conclude that developing countries are also hampered by relatively low e¢ ciency at using their inputs -e¢ ciency gaps. The research and policy agenda would then have to focus on 1 technology, allocative e¢ ciency, competition, and other determinants of the e¢ cient use of capital. The three samples di¤er in the data available to measure human capital. In the broad sample human capital is measured in the context of a "Mincerian" framework, where the key inputs are schooling (years of education) and health (as proxied by the adult survival rate). In the narrow and intermediate samples I augment the Mincerian framework with measures of cognitive skills, to account for additional factors such as schooling quality, parental inputs, and other in ‡uences on human capital not captured by years of schooling and health. The measures of cognitive skills are based on tests administered to school-age children. In the narrow sample, the test is a science test whose results are directly comparable between Latin America and the benchmark developed country. In the intermediate sample the tests were only administered in Latin America and can be compared to the benchmark country only on the basis of a number of ad hoc assumptions.
In all three samples I measure physical capital as an aggregate of reproducible and "natural" capital. Reproducible capital includes equipment and structures, while natural capital primarily includes subsoil resources, arable land, and timber.
Given measures of physical capital gaps, as well gaps in the components of human capital, development-accounting uses a calibration to map these gaps into counter-factual income gaps, or the income gaps that would be observed based on di¤erences in human and capital endowments only. Because these counterfactual incomes are bundles of physical and human capital, I refer to the ratio of Latin American counterfactual incomes to the US counterfactual income as relative capital.
For each of the three samples I present results from two alternative calibrations, a "baseline"calibration and an "aggressive"calibration. The baseline calibration makes use of the existing body of microeconomic estimates of the Mincerian framework in the way that most closely …ts the theoretical framework of development accounting. As it turns out, this leads to coe¢ cients for the components of human capital that are substantially lower than in much existing work in development accounting -leading to relatively smaller estimated capital gaps and, correspondingly, larger e¢ ciency gaps. The aggressive calibration thus uses more conventional …gures as a robustness check.
When I use my benchmark calibration, irrespective of sample/cognitive skill correction, I …nd that relative capital and relative e¢ ciencies are almost identical. For example in the broad sample average relative capital and average relative e¢ ciency are both 44% -or roughly double actual average relative incomes. Hence, both capital gaps and e¢ ciency gaps are very large: the average Latin American country has less than half the capital (human and physical) per worker of the US, and uses it less than half as e¢ ciently.
Using the aggressive calibration, capital gaps are naturally larger, and e¢ ciency gaps correspondingly smaller. Nevertheless, even under this "best-case scenario" for the view that capital gaps are the key source of income gaps, average Latin American e¢ ciency is at most 60% of the US level, still implying a vast e¢ ciency gap.
In assessing this evidence, it is essential to bear in mind that e¢ ciency gaps contribute to income disparity both directly -as they mean that Latin America gets less out of its capital -and indirectly -since much of the capital gap itself is likely due to diminished incentives to invest in equipment, structure, schooling, and health caused by low e¢ ciency.
The consequences of closing the e¢ ciency gap would correspondingly be far reaching.
Explaining the Latin American e¢ ciency gap is therefore a high priority both for scholars and for policy makers. It is likely that this task will require …rm-level evidence. Firm level evidence would also be invaluable in checking the robustness of the developmentaccounting results, which are subject to severe data-quality limitations.
Conceptual Framework
The analytical tool at the core of development accounting is the aggregate production function. The aggregate production function maps aggregate input quantities into output. The main inputs considered are physical capital and human capital. The empirical literature so far has failed to uncover compelling evidence that aggregate input quantities deliver large external economies, so it is usually deemed safe to assume constant returns to scale.
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Given this assumption, one can express the production function in intensive form, i.e. by specifying all input and output quantities in per worker terms. In order to construct counterfactual incomes a functional form is needed. Existing evidence suggests that the share of capital in income does not vary systematically with the level of development, or with factor endowments [Gollin (2002) ]. Hence, most practitioners of development accounting opt for a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation. In sum, the production function for country i is
where y is output per worker, k is physical capital per worker, h is human capital per worker (quality-adjusted labor), and A captures unmeasured/unobservable factors that contribute to di¤erences in output per worker.
The term A is subject to much speculation and controversy. Practitioners refer to it as total factor productivity, technology, a measure of our ignorance, etc. Here I will refer to it as "e¢ ciency". Countries with a larger A are countries that, for whatever reasons, are more e¢ cient users of their physical and human capital.
The goal of development accounting is to assess the relative importance of e¢ ciency di¤erences and physical and human capital di¤erences in producing the di¤erences in income per worker we observe in the data. To this end, one constructs counterfactual incomes, or capital bundles,ỹ 
In this equation, s i measures average years of schooling in the working-age population, r i is a measure of health in the population, and t i is a measure of cognitive skills. The coe¢ cients s , r , and t map di¤erences in the corresponding variables into di¤erences in human capital. The model in (3) is attractive because it o¤ers a strategy for calibration of the para-3 There may well be signi…cant heterogeneity among Latin American countries, and, more importantly, between Latin America and the benchmark rich country, in the value of . However, it is not known how to perform development-accounting with country-speci…c capital shares. This is because measures of the capital stock are indices, so that a requirement for the exercise to make sense is that the results should be invariants to the units in which k is measured. Now
is not. 4 Some caveats as to the validity of of the functional form assumption in (3) are in order. There meters s , r , and t . In particular, combining (1), (3), and an assumption of perfect competition in labor markets, we obtain the "Mincerian"formulation
where w ij (s ij ; etc.) is the wage (years of schooling, etc.) of worker j in country i, and i is a country-speci…c term. This suggests that using within-country variation in wages, schooling, health, and cognitive skills one might in principle identify the coe¢ cients .
In practice, there are severe limitations in following this strategy, that we discuss after introducing the data.
Data
We work with three samples, broad, narrow, and intermediate. The broad data set contains all Latin American countries for which we have data for y, k, s, and r, all observed in 2005.
There are 22 such countries (excluded are Barbados, Cuba, and Paraguay, for which we have no capital data). The other two samples add alternative measures of t. The trade-o¤ is that one measure o¤ers a more credible comparison with the benchmark high-income country, but is only available for 9 Latin-American economies. The more dubious but more plentiful measure is available for 15 countries. All but one of the countries in the narrow sample are also in the intermediate sample (Trinidad and Tobago is the exception). The dataset also includes data from the USA, which we use as the benchmark rich country.
Per-worker income y i is variable rgdpwok from version 7.1 of the Penn World Tables   (PWT71) . Figure 1 shows per-worker income in each country in the broad sample relative to the USA, or y i =y U S . Countries that are also included in the narrow sample are in black, and countries that are in the intermediate but not the narrow sample are in grey. With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, all Latin America countries have per-worker incomes is considerable micro and macro evidence against the assumption that workers wiith di¤erent years of schooling are perfect substitutes [e.g. Caselli and Coleman (2006) ]. In this paper I abstract from the issue of imperfect substitutability. Caselli and Ciccone (2013) argue that consideration of imperfect substitution is unlikely to reduce the estimated importance of e¢ ciency gaps. well below 40% of the US level, sometimes much below. The horizontal lines show the three (unweighted) sample averages, indicating that the average country is only one …fth as productive as the USA.
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World Bank (2012) presents cross-sectional estimates of the total capital stock, k, as well as its components, for various years. The total capital stock includes reproducible capital, but also land, timber, mineral deposits, and other items that are not included in standard national-account-based data sets. The basic strategy of the World Bank team that constructed these data begins with estimates of the rental ‡ows accruing from di¤erent types of natural capital, which are then capitalized using …xed discount rates. I construct the total capital measure by adding the variables producedplusurban and natcap. American countries relative to the US, k i =k U S . The average Latin American worker is endowed with approximately one …fth of the physical capital of the average US worker. 5 In the narrow sample the average is higher due to the disproportionate weight of Trinidad and Tobago.
Labor-force weighted averages are reported in Table 1 below. For average years of schooling in the working-age population (which is de…ned as between 15 and 99 years of age) I rely on Barro and Lee (2013) . Note from equation (3) that for the purposes of constructing relative human capital h i =h U S what is relevant is the di¤erence in years of schooling s i s U S . The same will be true for r and t. Accordingly, in have always at least three year less schooling than American ones, and …ve on average.
As a proxy for the health status of the population, r, Weil (2007) proposes using the adult survival rate. The adult survival rate is a statistic computed from age-speci…c mortality rates at a point in time. It can be interpreted as the probability of reaching the age of 60, conditional on having reached the age of 15, at current rates of age-speci…c mortality. Since most mortality before age 60 is due to illness, the adult survival rate is a reasonably good proxy for the overall health status of the population at a given point in time. Relative to more direct measures of health, the advantage of the adult survival rate is that it is available for a large cross-section of countries. I construct the adult survival rate from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Speci…cally, this is the weighted average of male and female survival rates, weighted by the male and female share in the population. same subjects in third and sixth grade. These tests are described in greater detail in, e.g., Hanushek and Woessman (2012a) , who also argue that these tests may better re ‡ect within Latin-American di¤erences in cognitive skills.
From the perspective of this study, the main attraction of these alternative measures of cognitive skills is that they cover a signi…cantly larger sample. The biggest problem, of course, is that they exclude the United States (or any high-income country) and so, on the face of it, they are unusable for constructing counterfactual relative incomes. However, Hanushek and Woessman (2012a) propose a methodology to "splice" the regional scores into their worldwide sample. While this splicing involves a large number of assumptions that are di¢ cult to evaluate, it is worthwhile to assess the robustness of my results to these data. Needless to say measuring t by the above-described test scores is clearly very unsatis- The 2009 PISA science tests are reported on a scale from 0 to 1000, and they are normalized so that the average score among OECD countries (i.e. among all pupils taking the test in this set of countries) is (approximately) 500 and the standard deviation is (approxi-9 Hanushek and Woessman (2012a) splice the regional scores into world-wide scores that are themselves aggregates of multiple waves and multiple subject areas -obtained with a methodology described in Hanushek and Woessman (2012b) . 10 The method for estimating the average age of workers is described in footnote 25 of Caselli (2005) . the spliced regional tests -while arguably giving a more accurate sense of within Latin America di¤erences -are less suitable for poor country-rich country comparisons. Hence, the discrepancy in cognitive-skill gaps between the PISA and the regional scores implies that the latter should be treated with caution.
Calibration
The last, and most di¢ cult, step in producing counter-factual income gaps between US and Latin America is to calibrate the coe¢ cients s , r , and t . As discussed, equation (4) indicates that, using within country data on w, s, r, and t, one could in principle identify these coe¢ cients by running an extended Mincerian regression for log-wages. In implementing this plan, we are confronted with (at least) two important problems.
The …rst problem is that one of the explanatory variables, the adult survival rate r, by de…nition does not vary within countries. Estimating r directly is therefore a logical impossibility. To solve this problem Weil (2007) notices that, in the time series (for a sample of ten countries for which the necessary data is available), there is a fairly tight relationship between the adult survival rate and average height. In other words, he 
In choosing values for s , c , and d from the literature it is highly desirable to focus on microeconomic estimates of equation (5) that include all three right-hand variables. This is because s, c, and d are well-known to be highly positively correlated. 13 Hence, any OLS estimate of one of the coe¢ cients from a regression that omits one or two of the other two variables will be biased upward. The coe¢ cients reported by Vogl are as follows (see his Table 4 , column 7). The return to schooling s is 0.072, which can be plugged directly in equation (3). The "return to height" c is 0.013. Hence, the coe¢ cient associated with the adult survival rate in (3) 13 See, e.g., the literature review in Vogl (2014). 14 An alternative would be to use IV estimates of the s, but instruments for the variables on the right hand side of equation 5 are often somewhat controversial -especially for height and cognitive skills. 15 The test is the short-form Raven's Progressive Matrices Test. 16 Needless to say there are aspects of Vogl's treatment that imply the regressions he runs are not a perfect …t for the conceptual framework of the paper. It may have been preferable for our pusposes to include both men and women. He also controls for ethnicity, age, and age squared, which do not feature in my framework. Finally, he notes that the Raven's core is a coarse measure of cognitive skills, giving raise to concerns with attenuation bias (more on this below The coe¢ cients in my baseline calibration are considerably lower than those used in other development-accounting exercises. For schooling, applications usually gravitate towards the "modal" Mincerian coe¢ cient of 0.10. For the adult survival rate, Weil (2007) uses 0.65, on the basis of considerably higher estimates of the returns to height than those reported by Vogl. For the return to cognitive skills, Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a) advocate 0.002, which is more than one order of magnitude larger than the value I derive from the Vogl's estimates.
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The fact that the parameters calibrated on Vogl's estimates are smaller than those commonly used is consistent with the discussion above. In particular, the alternative estimates are often based on regressions that omit one or two of the variables in (5), and are therefore upward biased. Another consideration is that there is considerable crosscountry heterogeneity in the estimates, and that researchers often focus on estimates from the USA, which are often larger. to estimate the return to cognitive skills in a set of 13 countries. The value of 0.002 is the one for the USA. 19 For example, in Hanushek and Zhang (2009) , the estimated market return to cognitive skills varies (from minimum to maximum) by a factor of 10! The estimate from the USA, which is used in Hanushek and Woessman (2012a) is the maximum of this distribution. 20 This is actually an issue with the capital share as well. However, the issue there is less severe as observed capital shares do not vary systematically with y, so it should be possible to ascribe the observed variation to measurement error. In other words the patterns of variation in do not necessarily rise the issue of model mispeci…cation.
On the other hand, Vogl's regressions are admittedly estimated via OLS, and there is a real concern with attenuation bias from measurement error. In order to gauge the sensitivity of my results to possibly excessively low values of the calibration parameters due to attenuation bias, I will also present results based on an "aggressive" calibration, which uses a Mincerian return of 0.10, Weil's 0.65 value for the mapping of the adult survival rate to human capital, and Hanushek and Woessman's 0.002 coe¢ cient on the PISA test. In order to go from their coe¢ cient d to the coe¢ cient of interest t we need to multiply the former by the ratio of the standard deviation of d U S;i to the standard deviation of t U S;i . Since Hanushek and Zhang standardize the variable d, we just have to multiply by the inverse of the standard deviation of t U S;i . But in the test we are using this is just 0.98, so the correction would be immaterial.I use the same value both in the narrow and in the intermediate sample.
the value of h i =h U S when excluding cognitive skills, and is thus fully comparable across all countries in the …gure. The solid bars are the values when including cognitive skills.
Irrespective of sample and cognitive-skill correction the average Latin American worker is endowed with approximately 70% of the human capital of the average US worker. 
Results

Baseline Calibration
In the large sample we lack cognitive skill information for more than half of the countries, so we set t = 0. In Figure 9 we extend our calculations to include information on cognitive skills based on worldwide PISA test scores. The sample size correspondingly drops to 9 countries.
The e¤ect of including cognitive skills under my baseline calibration is virtually nil: the mean remains unchanged at 0.49. This result is expected given the very small calibrated "loading" on cognitive skills implied by Vogl's estimates. Very similar patterns emerge when using the regional scores/intermediate sample, as seen in Figure 10 . 
"Aggressive" Calibration
My baseline calibration uses coe¢ cients for mapping years of schooling, health, and cognitive skills into human capital that, taken individually, are lower than those presented in other contributions. In this section I explore the robustness to my results to more commonly-used values. Hence, I set s = 0:10, r = 0:65, and t = 0:002.
Results from the large sample using this aggressive calibration are shown in Figure 11 .
Given the larger coe¢ cients, counterfactual incomes are necessarily smaller than under the baseline calibration. Yet quantitatively the di¤erence is not very large. Average relative capital drops to 40%, so still roughly double relative income. Figure 12 shows the results from the aggressive calibration using the PISA test scores.
Including cognitive skills in the calculation of relative capital has a much bigger impact than under the baseline, because the coe¢ cient on cognitive skills is an order of magnitude larger. The average counterfactual relative income falls to 40%, compared with 49% in the baseline calibration (within the same narrow sample). This is a large gain in explanatory power of observables. For many countries, the gap between relative income and relative capital shrinks considerably.
Finally, Figure 13 reports the results from the aggressive calibration when using the regional test scores. Recall that these tests tend to show even larger cognitive gaps with the US. Correspondingly, using these tests in combination with the aggressive calibration leads to an even better alignment between relative capital and relative income.
Implications for E¢ ciency Gaps
We have seen that, depending on cognitive skill correction, counterfactual income ratios (relative capital) in Latin America tend to be much larger than actual income ratios. This discrepancy implies that Latin America su¤ers from an e¢ ciency gap as much as it su¤ers from a capital gap.
We can quantify e¢ ciency gaps by noting, from (1) and (2), that
Hence, Latin American e¢ ciency gaps can be directly gleaned from Figures (8) - (13) by simply dividing the height of the shaded bars by the overall height of the bars.
In Table 1 I report the sample averages of the implied e¢ ciency gaps, for the various cognitive skill correction -calibration combinations. For completeness I also report the corresponding averages for relative income and relative capital, as well as labor-force weighted means.
Using the baseline calibration, average relative capital and average relative e¢ ciency are almost identical, irrespective of sample/cognitive skill correction/weighting. One way to put this is that capital gaps and e¢ ciency gaps contribute equally to Latin American income gaps. When using the aggressive calibration, the relative importance of capital gaps increases, particularly when adding the cognitive-skill corrections. Still, even under the most aggressive scenario average Latin American relative e¢ ciency is only 60% of US e¢ ciency.
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In order to fully appreciate the importance of these e¢ ciency gaps it is crucial to note that, under almost any imaginable set of circumstances, physical (speci…cally, reproducible) and human capital accumulation respond to a country's level of e¢ ciency. The higher A 22 In the narrow sample it is probably best to focus on the labor-force weighted results, as the unweighted ones give disproportionate weight to Trinidad and Tobago. the higher the marginal productivity of capital, leading to enhanced incentives to invest in equipment and structure, schooling, etc. While quantifying this e¤ect is di¢ cult, most theoretical frameworks would lead one to expect it to be large. Hence, it is legitimate to conjecture that a signi…cant fraction of the capital gap may be due to the e¢ ciency gap.
7 Implications and Conclusions
There is a large gap in income per worker between Latin America and the USA: Latin American workers are only about one …fth as productive as workers from the United States. A development-accounting calculation reveals that both capital gaps and e¢ ciency gaps contribute to this overall productivity gap. In particular, a Cobb-Douglas aggregate 23 In principle, one might also argue for a reverse direction of causation, with larger physical and humancapital stocks leading to higher e¢ ciency. In particular, this would be true if the model was misspeci…ed, and there were large externalities. But as already mentioned the empirical literature has not to date uncovered signi…cant evidence of externalities in physical and human capital. of observable physical and human capital per worker is roughly in the order of 40% on average of the corresponding US level (capital gap) -implying that the e¢ ciency with which inputs are used in Latin America is in the order of 50% of US levels (e¢ ciency gap).
Reducing this e¢ ciency gap would reduce the overall productivity gap both directly, by allowing Latin America to reap greater bene…ts from its physical and human capital, and indirectly, since much of the capital gap is likely due to the e¢ ciency gap itself: closing the e¢ ciency gap would stimulate investment at rates potentially capable of closing the capital gap as well.
These conclusions are contingent on the quality of the underlying macroeconomic data.
There is growing concern about the quality and reliability of the PPP national-account …gures in the Penn World Tables and similar data sets [e.g. Johnson et al. (2013) ]. Similar concerns apply, no doubt, to our proxies for human capital as well (as already discussed particularly in the context of cognitive skills). It is true that such concerns are most often voiced in the context of implied comparisons of changes, especially over short time spans:
cross-country comparisons of levels reveal such gigantic di¤erences (as seen above) that they seem unlikely to be entirely dominated by noise. Still, exclusive reliance on these macro data is highly inadvisable. Fortunately, it is also increasingly unnecessary. The increasing availability of …rm level data sets, particularly when matched with employee-level information (e.g. about schooling), provides an opportunity to supplement the macro picture with microeconomic productivity estimates comparable across countries.
The bene…t of producing such micro productivity estimates is by no means limited to permitting to check the robustness of conclusions concerning average capital and e¢ ciency gaps -though this bene…t alone is su¢ cient to make such exercises worthwhile. An additional bene…t is to uncover information on the within country distribution of physical capital, human capital, and e¢ ciency. A relatively concentrated distribution would suggest that e¢ ciency gaps are mostly due to aggregate, macroeconomic factors that a¤ect all …rms fairly equally (e.g. impediment to technology di¤usion from other countries). A very dispersed distribution, with some …rms close to the world technology frontier, would be more consistent with allocative frictions that prevent capital and labor to ‡ow to the more e¢ cient/talented managers. More generally, …rm-level data is likely to prove essential in the quest for the determinants of the large e¢ ciency gaps revealed by the development-accounting calculation. After all, (in-)e¢ ciency is -by de…nition -a …rm-level phenomenon. Most of the most plausible possible explanations for the e¢ ciency gap are microeconomic in nature -whether it is about …rms unable to adapt technologies developed in more technologically-advanced countries, failures in the market for managers and/or capital, frictions in the matching process for workers, etc. It seems implausible that evidence for or against these mechanisms can be found in the macro data. Yet understanding the sources of the Latin American e¢ ciency gap is unquestionably the most urgent task for those who want to design policies aimed at closing the Latin American income gap.
